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STERLING v. STERLING
making the agreement to forbear,22 there is little question
that the claim is "doubtful", that surrender of the right to
assert it is sufficient consideration. The claim surrendered
in the instant case meets this characterization. The right
to bring bastardy proceedings is conferred by statute,28
there being no common law paternal obligation to support
illegitimate children. But the statute does not state who
shall have the right to bring the action, primarily because
such a proceeding is a criminal action brought by the state.
As well as failing to define or limit the class of persons who
may commence such proceedings, it does not specify any
type, quality, or amount of evidence necessary to the suc-
cessful prosecution of the case. The principles applicable
to this statute are the same as those imposed upon the
naturally ambiguous or unconstrued enactments.
J. M. ROULHAC
The Basis Of Title By Adverse Possession
Sterling v. Sterling'
In March or April of 1935, Jake Sterling erected a crab-
bing shanty on pilings in the navigable waters of Ape's
Hole Creek. He made the shanty generally available, and
many of the watermen used it for the purpose of shucking
oysters, dumping the shells over into the creek. Through
the depositing of these oyster shells an artificially formed
island began to appear in November or December of 1935,
and had developed into a formation of substantial propor-
tions. On April 29, 1955, the State of Maryland issued a
patent to the said island to Guy Sterling, who, on May 16,
1955, brought suit in equity to enjoin Jake from trespassing
on the island and to remove the buildings and floats which
he had constructed thereon. Jake answered that he had
gained title to the island by adverse possession. On appeal
from a dismissal of the bill by the Circuit Court for Somer-
set County, the Court of Appeals reversed.
As pointed out by the Court, the land above water aspect
of the case was conclusively governed by Article 57, Sec-
tion 10 of the 1951 Code, which provides that:
United States v. American Trading Co. of San Francisco, 138 F. Supp.
536 (D. C. N. D. Cal., 1956).
"Md. Code (1951), Art. 12, Sec. 2.
211 Md. 493, 128 A. 2d 277 (1957).
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".. . if it shall appear in evidence that the person...
or those under whom (he) claim(s) have held the
lands in possession for twenty years before the action
brought, such possession shall be a bar to all right or
claim derived from the State under any patent
issued..."I
The defendant's own testimony admittedly showing that
the island in question was not in esse prior to November
or December of 1935 and the action having been instituted
on May 16, 1955, the defendant's possession fell several
months short of the twenty year period statutorily requi-
site, inter alia, for an adverse possessor or disseisor to gain
title to the land in dispute.
In the land under navigable waters aspect of the case,
although apparently arriving at the correct holding, the
Court erred in basing its holding upon the premise that the
foundation of title by adverse possession is the presumption
of a lost grant, for that confuses the basis of adverse use
with adverse possession; title by adverse possession rests
upon the running of the Statute of Limitations of 21 James
I, c. 16,3 in effect in Maryland by virtue of the Maryland
Constitution.'
The Court pointed out that by virtue of an Act of 1862,
since re-enacted and amended,' the State has neither the
authority nor the power to convey land under navigable
waters: ". . . no patent shall hereafter issue for land covered
by navigable waters".6 Therefore, the Court in reversing
the Circuit Court, reasoned that since the State is power-
less to grant land under navigable waters, it necessarily
follows that there can be no presumption of such a grant
in favor of an adverse possessor of such land. This reason-
ing would be sound if the presumption of a lost grant were
the basis for the accrual of title by adverse possession in
Maryland. In support of the lost grant presumption as a
theoretical basis, the instant case refers to the leading
Maryland case in this area of the law, Sollers v. Sollers,7
by quoting from its opinion:
".... title by possession presumes a grant, and such
a presumption cannot be entertained as against one in-
capable of granting . . .No title, therefore, could be
2 Parenthetical material supplied.
8 2 ALEX. BRIT. STAT. (2d ed., 1912) 599.
4DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, Art. V.
5MD. CODE (1951) Art. 54, Sec. 48; Md. Laws 1955, Ch. 47.
6 Ibid.
777 Md. 148, 26 A. 188 (1893).
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acquired by possession as against the State, in the face
of the statute, which expressly provides that no such
grant shall be made...,,
Likewise in Hodson v. Nelson,9 a case in which the facts
are similar to those of the instant case, the same doctrine
was reiterated.
The earliest reported case dealing with adverse posses-
sion was Cheney's Lessee v. Watkins ° in 1804, in which the
Court promulgated the theory that from great length of
possession of the land, the payment of taxes, etc., the jury
may presume a conveyance from the patentee. After re-
affirming this principle in a series of cases," the Court in
1844 decided the oft-cited case of Casey v. Inloes," in
which it held that a continuous possession of twenty years
or upwards, in a party, or those claiming under him, would
authorize him or them to supply the absence of a convey-
ance to such party from one seized before him, by re-
quiring the court to instruct the jury to presume such a
conveyance.'3
Finally eleven years later, the case of Armstrong v.
Risteau,"4 held out the hope that the Court was going to
correct itself, when it stated that:
"More than a century and a half ago it was decided
by Lord Holt, that 'if A has possession of land for more
than twenty years uninterrupted, and then B gains
possession, upon which A brings ejectment, though A
is plaintiff, yet his possession for twenty years will be
a good title for him as well as if A had then been in
possession, because possession for twenty years, by
virtue of the Statute of James I, ch. 16, is like a descent
at common law, which tolls the entry.' Stocker v.
Berny, 1 Lord Raymond, 741..
Nevertheless, the proper approach of resting the doctrine
of adverse possession upon the running of the Statute of
Limitations was forgotten when the next case in point
Ibid, 152.
'122 Md. 330, 89 A. 934 (1914).
S1H. & J. 527 (Md., 1804).
"Dale v. Fassett, 3 H. & J. 119 (Md. 1810); Bradford v. McComas, 3
H. & J. 444 (Md. 1813); Mundell v. Clerklee, 3 H. & J. 462 (Md. 1814);
Hammond v. Ridgely, 5 H. & J. 245 (Md. 1821) ; Lee v. Hoye, 1 Gill 188
(Md. 1843).
321 Gill 430 (Md. 1844).
21 Ibid, circa 497.
14 5 Md. 256 (1853).
Ibid, 270.
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arose, in 1863, the Court again falling back upon its old
statement that:
".... the consistency of the possession ... constitutes
the evidential fact from which the law infers that it
originated in grant."' 6
And two years later, citing Casey v. Inloes, the Court again
stated:
"Presumptions of deeds for the protection of
ancient possessions, are made upon principles of public
policy.' 17
And so this assumption that title by adverse possession
rests upon the presumption of a lost grant has been carried
through a further series of cases 18 up to and including the
instant one.
Several early English statutes limited the time within
which an action to recover seisin could be brought, not by
defining a set number of years before the institution of the
action as is the mode of more recent legislation, but by
naming a particular year back of which a litigant could not
go for the purpose of establishing his title." Under the
earliest statute of limitations a litigant could not allege the
seisin of his ancestor prior to the beginning of the reign of
Henry I (1100); this was altered by the Statute of Merton
to the beginning of the reign of Henry 11 (1154) .20 The final
statute to utilize this method of limiting real actions was
the Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edward I, c. 39 (1275),
which stipulated that one could not allege the seisin of his
ancestor beyond the beginning of the reign of Richard I
(1189) .21 The effect of these statutes was that seisin at the
prohibitive date, even if tortious, became the paramount
source of title.22
The first statute to adopt the modern method of fixing
limitations on real actions was that of 32 Henry VIII, c. 2
(1540), which limited any allegation of seisin in the litigant
to within thirty years of the teste or date of the original
writ, in regard to both droitural and possessory actions, and
Colvin v. Warford, 20 Md. 357, 395 (1863).
'
7 Balto. Chem. Manf. Co. v. Dobbin, 23 Md. 210, 218 (1865).
Crook v. Glenn, 30 Md. 55 (1869) ; Lannay v. Wilson, 30 Md. 536 (1869);
Cadwalader v. Price, 111 Md. 310, 73 A. 273 (1909). 2 AunX. BRIT. STAT.
(2d ed. 1912) 599-628.
10 TIFFANY, RA.L PRoP aTY (Abr. ed. 1940), 776, Sec. 743; Ballantine,
Title By Adverse Possession, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 135, 137 (1918).
11 TIFFANY, loe. cit., ibid, fn. 2.
Ballantine, supra, n. 20, 137.
= Ibid.
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any allegation of seisin in an ancestor to within fifty years
in a possessory action, and to within sixty years in a droi-
tural action. 3
However, this statute applied only to the old real
actions, and when ejectment took their place, the Statute
of 21 James I, c. 16 (1623), was enacted to preclude, or
limit, the right of entry, and thus the action of ejectment,
to within twenty years of the accrual of the right or title
in controversy. Therefore, under this statute, a possession
maintained adversely and continuously for twenty years
becomes a source of title paramount in ejectment to any
title derived from an older possession, grant, or patent.24
The Statute of 21 James I, c. 16, being Maryland law
by virtue of Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights," our courts should take cognizance of its existence
for the sake of accurate jurisprudence and not continue to
confuse title by adverse possession with the somewhat
similar doctrine of prescription.
DENE L. LusBY
Unloaded Pistol As A Dangerous Weapon Within
The Robbery Statute
Hayes v. State'
Defendant was indicted for attempted robbery with a
dangerous and deadly weapon. After trial before the court
sitting without a jury, he was found guilty and sentenced
to twenty years in the Maryland Penitentiary. On appeal,
he contended that the verdict was erroneous because the
evidence clearly showed that the pistol used in the robbery
attempt was unloaded, and therefore not a dangerous and
deadly weapon. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convic-
tion, holding that the unloaded gun was "dangerous" under
the robbery statute and that it was not necessary to con-
sider the question of "deadly", for the conditions were in
the alternative.
Ibid, 138.
'Ibid. The Statute of 21 James I, c. 16, 2 ALEx. BRIT. STAT. (2d ed. 1912)
599, however, did not bar real action by writ of right which ran for an addi-
tional forty years. (This problem did not arise in Maryland, however, as
the writ of right was not a recognized form of action.) To rectify this
si'tuation in England, the Statute of 3 and 4 William I, c. 27 (1833),
stipulated the extinguishment of the former title after twenty years. The
Statute of 37 and 38 Victoria, c. 57, popularly known as the Real Property
Limitation Act of 1874, reduced the period of limitation to twelve years.
2 ALex. BRIT. STAT. (2d ed. 1912) 599-628.
1 211 Md. 111, 126 A. 2d 576 (1956).
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